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COMMENTS
CURING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY:
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO
MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Congress enacted legislation that changed the form of Medicare
reimbursement for inpatient services from a direct cost reimbursement sys-
tem to a prospective payment system (PPS).' Under the direct cost reim-
bursement system, the federal government reimbursed a hospital for the
actual dollar amount the Medicare patient cost the hospital. The only re-
quirement imposed on a hospital was that the cost for the treatment be rea-
sonable.2 In order to cut the high cost of the Medicare program, the federal
government established the PPS. Under the PPS, a hospital is only reim-
bursed a fixed, predetermined sum for the treatment rendered. This sum is
determined by the "average cost of treating a patient in a particular Diag-
nostic-Related Group (DRG),"' regardless of the Medicare patient's actual
cost to the hospital. Thus, if a Medicare patient's cost to the hospital ex-
ceeds the prospective payment, the hospital loses money. As a result, a
greater need for hospital efficiency and expansion arose in order for hospitals
to increase their revenue base and profit margin.4
In order to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and increase revenue, hospi-
tals have embarked upon various ventures. These ventures include physician
1. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 60-107, 97 Stat. 65, 149-72
(1983). For an account of the Medicare system surrounding the change to and enactment of
PPS, see generally Hyman and Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives in a
"Competitive" Health Care Era, 19 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 1133, 1136-43, 1166-69 (1988); see also
Comment, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments: Their Impact on the
Present Health Care System, 36 EMORY L.J. 691, 691-727 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Medi-
care-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments].
2. See Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1,
at 701.
3. Id. at 703; see also Hyman and Williamson, supra note 1, at 1138-1143.
4. Increasing a hospital's revenue base is a concern for both a for-profit and not-for-profit
hospital. In order to survive, each type of hospital must remain financially viable through
effectively employing their existing revenue. Although this Comment will focus on for-profit
hospitals, not-for-profit hospitals conceivably could still be affected by the addressed issues
surrounding the hospital's increase of its revenue base and profit margin.
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incentive plans,5 hospital-physician joint ventures,6 and physician recruit-
ment programs. 7 If these revenue enhancing plans are not carefully struc-
tured and implemented, both the hospital and the physicians involved in the
plan run the risk of violating the Medicare fraud and abuse laws, 8 under
which it is illegal to knowingly solicit or receive any form of remuneration in
return for the referral of patients.
The clear language of the anti-kickback provision,9 broad judicial inter-
5. Physician incentive plans are programs set up within a hospital through which hospi-
tals reward physicians for their cost-conscious behavior in administering patient care. See
infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
6. Hospital-physician joint ventures are contractual arrangements between hospitals and
physicians where the participating parties exchange their services in the delivery of health care
to the community. See infra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
7. Physician recruitment programs are set up by hospitals to recruit and obtain outstand-
ing physicians for the hospital's own affiliation. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. 1988) (recodifying 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1982)).
Medicare, Title 18 of the Social Security Act, provides health insurance "for the elderly over
65 who were eligible for social securtiy benefits and for certain disabled persons." Comment,
Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at 696 (footnote omit-
ted).' Medicaid, Title 19 of the Social Security Act issues payments in the form of grants to the
states to provide health insurance for the medically indigent. Id. (The structuring and intrica-
cies of the two forms of governmental medical insurance are beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. For a further, in depth analysis of the structure of the two forms of governmental
medical insurance, see id. at 696-99.). The substance of the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kick-
back provisions are substantially similar; however, for simplicity this Comment focuses pri-
marily on Medicare fraud and abuse.
9. 42 U.S.C.A. 1320a-7b(b) states:
(b) Illegal remunerations
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or co-
vertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter
or a State health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recom-
mending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or
item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under sub-
chapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State
health care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leas-
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pretation of the enforcement provision,"0 and sufficient declination of the
prosecution of kickback violations by the Department of Justice (DOJ)"
have fostered an air of uncertainty within the health care and legal commu-
nities as to the scope of the Medicare anti-kickback provisions. Hospitals
have weighed the illegality of their conduct against the probability of prose-
cution'" for various cost-effective arrangements. After assessing that
ing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter
or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to-
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of services
or other entity under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health
care program if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and appro-
priately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider
or entity under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care
program;
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide
employment relationship with such employer) for employment in the
provision of covered items or services;
(C) any amount paid by a vendor of goods or services to a person authorized
to act as a purchasing agent for a group of individuals or entities who are
furnishing services reimbursed under subchapter XVIII of this chapter
or a State health care program if-
(i) the person has a written contract, with each such individual or en-
tity which specifies the amount to be paid the person, which amount
may be a fixed amount or a fixed percentage of the value of the
purchases made by each such individual or entity under the con-
tract, and
(ii) in the case of an entity that is a provider of services (as defined in
section 1395x(u) of this title, the person discloses (in such form and
manner as the Secretary requires) to the entity and, upon request, to
the Secretary the amount received from each such vendor with re-
spect to purchases made by or on behalf of the entity; and
(D) any payment practice specified by the Secretary in regulations promul-
gated pursuant to section 14(a) of the Medicare and Medicaid Patient
and Program Protection Act of 1987 ....
10. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 988 (1985).
To date Greber is the most elaborate judicial determination of the Medicare anti-kickback
provisions. In Greber, the court determined that even if payments from a health care entity to
a physician participating in the Medicare reimbursement system were made in compensation
for services rendered, the Medicare anti-kickback provision was violated if the payments were
made to induce future referrals. Id. at 72. This broad interpretive holding is supported in a
subsequent case. See United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985). For a more
detailed discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 32-48.
11. See Volk, Medicare/Medicaid Fraud and Abuse in the Reimbursement System, 6
WHITTIER L. REv. 857, 858 (1984).
12. See Kusserow, OIG Mission, Staff, Record, in MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: UN-
DERSTANDING THE LAW 46 (1986).
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probability, some hospitals in tight financial situations have proceeded into
revenue enhancing areas that may constitute technical violations of the
law. 3 The real impact of hospitals engaged in these technically illegal prac-
tices of raising revenue is that they are driving hospitals who are strictly
observing the letter of the Medicare fraud and abuse laws out of business.
The rendering of competent, legal advice to the affected hospitals and phy-
sicians becomes an issue for health lawyers when the scope of these laws and
regulations are unclear. Ethically, lawyers cannot advise their hospital and
physician clients to enter business arrangements that violate the law even
though the risk of prosecution may be slight. The other option lawyers have
is to advise their hospital and physician clients to follow the strict letter of
the law. This latter option, however, may cause hospitals and physicians to
forego possible advantageous business arrangements that may increase their
cost effectiveness, their revenue bases, and ultimately their ability to deliver
health care services.
In response to the growing uncertainty within the health law field, Con-
gress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection
Act of 1987 (" 1987 Act"). 14 The 1987 Act broadens the enforcement power
of the anti-kickback statutes by expanding the disciplinary authority to the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) within the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS)."5 Furthermore, the 1987 Act mandates that HHS
issue final regulations by August of 1989, exempting from disciplinary action
certain business practices of hospitals and physicians.' 6 This enactment and
13. The Medicare anti-kickback provision prohibits both the offering and receiving of any
form of remuneration. This broad statutory language incorporated not only clearly abusive
and violative kickback practices, but also nonabusive practices such as providing free cups of
coffee to a hospital's staff. Gaynor and Decator, Joint Ventures and Medicare-Medicaid Fraud
and Abuse Laws, 41 TRUSTEE 23 (Apr. 1988). Although these two examples are on opposite
ends of the spectrum of the Medicare fraud and abuse laws, they illustrate the sweeping effect
of the provisionary language. Within this wide scope of the law are many legitimate, finan-
cially necessary, non abusive arrangements between hospitals and physicians.
14. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Act].
15. Id. § 2, 101 Stat. 680, 681-82 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (Supp. 1988)).
Previously enforcement was a criminal matter and authority existed solely with DOJ. Now
HHS has the civil authority to exlude the violating hospital from participation in the Medicare
and Medicaid systems. This exlusion would disallow any federal reimbursement of hospital
cost for treatment rendered and thwart some hospitals' efforts to increase their revenue base.
16. 1987 Act, § 14, 101 Stat. 680, 697. Proposed regulations were issued on January 23,
1989 with a comment period extending until March 24, 1989. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3088 (1989)
(to be codified 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001). HHS will review the comments and issue final regulations
in August 1989. Interested practitioners should be aware of this date; however the proposed
regulations were supposed to be issued in August, 1988 and were not issued until five months
later. Therefore a constant watch of HHS action is essential to acquiring knowledge of these
final regulations.
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subsequent promulgation of exemptions demonstrate a governmental re-
sponse aimed at curing the uncertainty and fostering a more efficient and
market-responsive health care industry.
This Comment outlines and analyzes the 1987 Act's expansion of govern-
ment enforcement authority under the Medicare fraud and abuse laws. Sub-
sequently, an analysis of the wide array of business arrangements illustrates
the complexity of the fraud and abuse concerns. Finally, the issuance of
proposed regulations and further congressional guidance provides the health
care industry with a semblance of certainty and continuity in this unclear
area. This Comment concludes that the 1987 Act commences a curative
governmental response to the uncertainty within the health care industry
and fosters eventual growth and development throughout the health law
field.
II. THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PATIENT AND PROGRAM
PROTECTION ACT OF 1987
The 1987 Act performs three functions regarding kickbacks within the
Medicare system: consolidation of enforcement provisions; expansion of dis-
ciplinary authority; and regulation from which guidelines may be derived.
A. Consolidation of Enforcement Provisions
Prior to the 1987 Act, the Medicare anti-kickback provision was found in
section 1877(b) of the Social Security Act. 17 The provision prohibited any
individual or entity from soliciting or receiving any remuneration in return
for patient referrals, as well as from offering or paying any remuneration to
induce these referrals. Violation of this statute constituted a felony with the
imposition of a fine not to exceed $25,000, or a prison term no longer than
five years, or both. 18 Statutory exemptions to the anti-kickback provision
included practices first, where a discount in price was obtained by a provider
of services "if the reduction in price [was] properly disclosed and appropri-
ately reflected in the costs claimed,"' 9 second, where a bona fide employ-
ment relationship existed and an employer made a payment to an employee
for Medicare related items or services,2 ° and third, where a vendor of goods
made a payment to an individual or entity acting as a group purchasing
organization when the amount of the payment had been contractually set
17. Social Security Act, § 1877(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1982) dealt solely with Medi-
care fraud and abuse. It contained substantially the same effectual language with regard to the
Medicare program as does the recodified version of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. 1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(3)(A) (1982).
20. Id. at § 1395nn(b)(3)(B);
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and proper disclosure was evident.2 '
The Medicaid anti-kickback provision contained substantially identical
language.22 These provisions were spread throughout the Social Security
Act. While maintaining the same effectual language and enforcement
power, the 1987 Act consolidated these provisions. 23 While the simplifica-
tion and unification of these enforcement provisions did not affect the distri-
bution of health care services, it was a constructive step toward clarifying
complex legislation.
B. Expansion of Authority
Prior to the 1987 Act the only enforcement for the Medicare anti-kick-
back provision was criminal prosecution initiated by the DOJ. The 1987
Act expands to HHS the authority to impose penalties for kickback pay-
ments.24 In addition to criminal penalties, which are still contained in the
anti-kickback provision, the Secretary of HHS has the authority to exclude
from the Medicare program any individual or entity which he determines
has engaged in prohibited conduct relating to the giving or receiving of kick-
backs for patient referrals. 25 The basis for this enforcement authority is the
broad anti-kickback language of the Social Security Act. 26 Furthermore, the
standard of judicial review is lower than that of a criminal proceeding.27
The legislative history states that "the burden of proof requirements under
this authority would be those customarily applicable to administrative
21. Id. at § 1395nn(b)(3)(C).
22. Social Security Act § 1909(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b) (1982).
23. 1987 Act § 4, 101 Stat. 680, 688-89. Social Security Act § 1877(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395nn(b) was repealed and replaced by Social Security Act, § 1128B, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-
7b(b) (Supp. 1988). Even though enforcement of the anti-kickback provisions are contained
within the same section, the actual enforcement procedure is different. The focus of this Com-
ment is limited to fraud and abuse within the Medicare system. Health lawyers should be
aware of the differences with regard to eligibility requirements, payment structure, and en-
forcement proceedings of each system. To obtain the required knowledge of the Medicaid
insurance system, investigation of each individual state's health care program is essential.
24. 1987 Act at § 2(b)(7), 101 Stat. 680, 681-82 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 1320a-7(b)(7)
(Supp. 1988)).
25. Id. Exclusion would be a preclusion of any Medicare payment issued for any services
rendered by a provider of health care. 1987 Act, § 8(c), 101 Stat. 680, 692-93, amending
section 1862 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395y(e) (1982); 1987 Act, § 10, 101 Stat.
680, 696.
26. Social Security Act § 1128B, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. 1988).
27. See 1987 Act, § 2(f), 101 Stat. 680, 685. The standard of proof in a criminal proceed-
ing is that the evidence must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." In Steadman v. SEC,
450 U.S. 91 (1981), the Supreme Court stated that evidence presented in agency proceedings,
absent any congressional mandate as to the required standard of proof, must only be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence, not a heightened level of scrutiny. Id. at 104.
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proceedings."28
With this broad grant of enforcement authority, special due process re-
quirements are imposed. Rather than pre-hearing exclusion, "any individual
or entity that is the subject of an adverse determination under subsection
(b)(7) [Permissive Exclusion for Fraud, Kickbacks, and other Prohibited
Activities] shall be entitled to a hearing by an administrative law judge...
before any exclusion based upon the determination takes effect." 29 The leg-
islative history specifies the reasoning behind this special review:
The Committee bill includes this special protection requiring a
pre-exclusion independent fact finding because some of the
grounds for exclusion under section 1128(b)(7) [section 2(b)(7) of
the 1987 Act], particularly the anti-kickback provisions of section
1128B, may involve practices that require adjudication to deter-
mine whether the requisite criminal intent existed to "knowingly
and willfully" violate the standards.
30
This special review would not apply in an instance where the Secretary de-
termines that a delay in exclusion would harm "the health or safety of indi-
viduals receiving services. "31
The lower burden of proof associated with exclusionary proceedings, and
the expansion of authority to HHS, suggest an increase in disciplinary ac-
tions in the future. This increase would provide an opportunity to formulate
guidelines from which the health law field may determine which type of
practices would be penalized. As a result, the 1987 Act has enabled clearer
standards to be formed, thereby providing some certainty within this area of
health care.
C. Judicial Interpretation -United States v. Greber
Prior to the 1987 Act, the scope of the Medicare anti kickback provisions
included a "wide range of practices within the healthcare industry-from
paying physicians a 'bounty' for each referred patient, which is clearly pro-
hibited, to providing free coffee to medical staff members."32 In United
States v. Greber,33 the court held that if payments were made to a physician
28. 1987 Act, S. Rep. No. 100-109, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 682, 690 (1987).
29. 1987 Act, § 2(f)(2), 101 Stat. 680, 685, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(f)(2) (Supp. 1988).
30. 1987 Act, S. Rep. No. 100-109, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 682, 683 (1987).
31. Id., reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 682, 694 (1987).
32. Gaynor and Decator, supra note 13.
33. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 988 (1985). Greber provides the
most recent insight into the enforcement power under the Medicare anti-kickback provision.
For a further in depth analysis of the Greber decision and its impact on potential physician
1!989]
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to induce future patient referrals, even if the payments were in compensation
for actual services rendered by the physician, the Medicare anti-kickback
provision had been violated by both parties.3 4 Greber involved a diagnostic
services company (Cardio-Med, Inc.) which provided physicians with a
Holter-Monitor." After Cardio-Med had analyzed the data received from
the monitored patient, it would bill Medicare for this service and return the
data to the physician along with a portion of the Medicare fee supposedly for
interpretation fees which the physician would perform after receiving the
data.36 These interpretation fees were provided to physicians even though
Cardio-Med already had interpreted and evaluated the data.37 Because the
physician would receive a benefit from the arrangement, there was an incen-
tive for the physician to retain an ongoing relationship with Cardio-Med for
their services. Although the defense argued that the funds were for profes-
sional services rendered, the court, in adopting the broadest interpretation of
the Medicare anti-kickback statute to date, found that where an intent to
receive future referrals exists, the statute has been violated.38
The problem endemic to all of these fraud and abuse cases is proving the
element of intent. In the Greber case sustaining this burden was relatively
easy for two reasons. First, the investigators found that Dr. Greber had
testified in an earlier civil case regarding the Holter Monitor that "if he did
not make this payment [from Medicare funds already received], physicians
would not select his company.",39 This statement exemplified an actual, dis-
cernable intent on the part of Dr. Greber to retain future referrals from the
physicians. Second, the Greber arrangement contained a "potential for un-
necessary drain on the Medicare system,"'  or overutilization.
The Greber court's broad interpretation of the Medicare anti-kickback
incentive plans and joint ventures, see Case-Comment, United States v. Greber: A New Era in
Medicare Fraud Enforcement?, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 309, 322-26 (1987); see
also, Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, 721-24.
34. Greber, 760 F.2d at 72.
35. Id. at 70. This device was worn for 24 hours by the patient and would record the
cardiac activity. A technician scanned the tape and recorded the data in a diary. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Miller, The Greber Case, in MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: UNDERSTANDING THE
LAW 16, 33 (1986).
39. Id. at 15.
40. Greber, 760 F.2d at 71. Gregory P. Miller, the prosecutor in the Greber case, suggests
that overutilization is the key to establishing intent. "If a suspicious financial relationship is
accompanied by overutilization, it can be inferred that the reason for the overutilization is the
financial benefit to the referring physician. Or, one might say that if there was no financial
benefit to the physician, why would he or she engage in overutilization". Miller, supra note 38,
at 16.
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provisions provided prosecutors at DOJ with a vast area of enforcement.41
If a relationship fell within the broad reach of the provision, it would be
subjected to increased scrutiny.42 Overutilization is one indicator to detect
fraud. Additionally, competing health care providers may inform HHS or
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of illegal financial arrangements
that should be prosecuted.43
The issue of subjecting to close scrutiny, and possible criminal prosecu-
tion, persons and entities involved in legitimate financial arrangements that
accrue no cost on the government has arisen due to a conflict these arrange-
ments have with the Medicare fraud and abuse laws.44 Furthermore, pro-
viding competent legal advice to a hospital or medical practitioner becomes
a legal as well as an ethical issue when the legal community is uncertain as to
what type of arrangement is covered by the law. Under a different, more
legitimate business arrangement, the courts might determine that the pay-
ment and referral devices are too remote to violate the anti-kickback provi-
sion and distinguish the Greber case.45 However, another judicial decision
defining this specific issue has not been prevalent since Greber.46 Given this
uncertainty, lawyers cannot possibly advise their clients of all the potential
ramifications of the anti-kickback provision.47 Because the anti-kickback
provision exclusively involved a criminal prosecution of violators, HHS
could not offer any sufficient assistance in delineating potential problem busi-
ness arrangements.48 Ultimately, the guidelines rested with the courts. The
law as to physician incentive plans, joint ventures, and physician recruitment
41. Miller, supra note 38, at 17.
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id. at 15. The issues of overutilization and cost- effectiveness aid the court in deter-
mining the legitimacy of the arrangement, but in no way are they conclusive. Id. at 16.
44. See Social Security Act, § 1877(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1982).
45. See Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1,
at 724.
46. Miller, supra note 38, at 18: but see United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir.
1985), where it was found that defendant received kickback payments in exchange for Medi-
care referrals, even though such payments also included "compensation for specimen collec-
tion and handling services." Id. at 1449. The appeal, however, focused upon two issues
involving false statements relating to the investigation of the kickbacks. Id. at 1448.
47. Miller, supra note 38, at 18.
48. See Tillman, Scope of the Conference, in MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE: UNDER-
STANDING THE LAW 10 (1986); see also the common language used in HHS advisory letters to
providers after the Greber decision:
Sections 1877 and 1909 are criminal provisions and as such, no one within the De-
partment has the authority to offer legal advice as to the applicability of the provi-
sions to particular factual situations. Rather, only the Department of Justice and the
individual offices of United States Attorneys have the discretion to decide whether or
not to prosecute a particular case, and only a court may rule on the applicability of
the law to the particular case before it. Nevertheless, having reviewed the descrip-
1989)
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programs was ambiguous. Prior to 1987 there existed a need for clarification
of the Medicare fraud and abuse laws after the Greber decision. The 1987
Act was designed to clarify some of the ambiguity that had existed. While it
does not completely solve all areas of uncertainity, it is a first step in the
right direction.
D. Promulgation of Guidelines
The 1987 Act provides the health care community with the opportunity to
acquire advice that is more than mere speculation. These guidelines will
take the form of issued regulations, or safe harbors.49 These regulations in-
vite public comment and provide HHS with the opportunity to promulgate
exemptions that are in concert with the pulse of the health law field. Addi-
tionally, advice could come from specific, fact sensitive, private letter rulings
addressed to the concerned parties analogous to those issued by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS)5" or the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
Under this form of regulation, although not mentioned in the proposed regu-
lations, health lawyers and affected health care providers would be able to
obtain current, sustantive advice on specific, proposed health distributing
arrangements. The employment of such a mechanism within HHS, who
would operate in consultation with DOJ, would be consistent with the con-
gressional purpose of abating the past uncertainty in this area.
The relevant legislative history of the 1987 Act indicates the frustration
existing within the health care industry:
It is the understanding of the committee that the breadth of [prior]
statutory language has created uncertainty among health care
providers as to which commercial arrangements are legitimate, and
which are proscribed. Neither the Attorney General nor the In-
spector General of the Department of Health and Human Services
has issued any regulations which would offer guidance to health
tions of the proposed arrangements set out in your letter, I can provide you with
some general guidance that may be helpful to you.
Letter from Robin Epstein Schneider, Attorney, Inspector General Division of HHS, January
6, 1986, and December 30, 1985 (emphasis added).
49. See infra notes 100-126 and accompanying text. Even if the final regulations do not
provide anything more than the obvious business arrangement exemptions from Medicare ex-
lusion or prosecution, the existence of exemptions themselves, combined with an ongoing input
into the rulemaking process improves the health care community in this area of law.
50. See Hyman and Williamson, supra note 1, at 1191-1192, where the authors argue for
the logical and beneficial employment of a private letter ruling mechanism within HHS. The
authors propose that this employment would not only provide ongoing review of business
arrangements, but also encourage innovation through limited disclosure of the specific
ventures.
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care providers in this regard. 51
The 1987 Act provides an opportunity to establish clearer standards through
an administrative rulemaking process. The legislative history states:
The committee expects that the Secretary will consult with affected
provider, practitioner, supplier, and beneficiary representatives
before publishing proposed rules, and that the rules will, to the
extent possible, contain criteria relative to prevalent controversies
or ambiguities that might apply to business arrangements
generally.52
The legislative history also states that the intent of Congress is to have HHS
receive constant public input so as to allow the regulations to remain current
and relevant.53 This rulemaking process is essential in maintaining the cura-
tive effect of the 1987 Act. Absent constant updating, innovative, efficient,
and non-abusive ventures will be thwarted in their implementation. As a
result, the frustration existing prior to the 1987 Act in the health care com-
munity would be revisited.
Through the enactment of the 1987 Act, Congress has constructively ena-
bled the health care community to move forward. The 1987 Act has not
limited the Greber application per se, rather it has allowed HHS, which is
theoretically more in touch with the health care community than DOJ, to
enforce the anti-kickback provision at an administrative level.54 The 1987
Act also has addressed the issue of differing fact patterns from that in Greber
in its mandate of HHS in consultation with DOJ to promulgate rules ex-
empting specific business arrangements from enforcement proceedings. De-
pending upon the HHS determination in its final regulations, the broad
Greber interpretation of the Medicare anti-kickback provision may be
narrowed. 55
III. DEVELOPMENT OF REVENUE ENHANCING ARRANGMENTS
A. Physician Incentive Plans
One of the ways hospitals have increased their revenue base is through the
implementation of physician incentive plans. These plans seek to develop
51. 1987 Act, H.R. Rep. No. 100-85, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 27.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See 1987 Act, § 2(f), 101 Stat. 680, 685, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(f) (Supp. 1988).
55. The issuance of the proposed regulations, see infra notes 100-126, illustrate that
although the Greber decision has not been narrowed significantly, some instances, such as the
selling of a retiring or relocating physician's practice to a hospital, will exist thereby narrowing
somewhat the broad scope of possible violations that existed under Greber.
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cost-conscious behavior among the physicians affiliated with the hospital.56
Commonly, these plans take the form of cash payments to the physician for
his effort in successfully reducing the hospital's cost of the inpatient serv-
ices.5 7 Such plans have been formulated in response to the "growing recog-
nition in society that if the health care industry is to function more
effectively, it must do so through cooperation [between hospitals and physi-
cians]." 58 Hospitals realize that their success under the PPS largely depends
upon the behavior of the physicians because "physicians control approxi-
mately sixty to eighty percent of the hospital's costs," '59 and "physicians' use
of [the hospital's] ancillary services and discharge decisions often determine
whether the hospital can meet its PPS target."'  Although arguably finan-
cially necessary, these plans pose serious legal as well as medical ethics issues
to the hospitals and physicians.
In order for a particular hospital's physician incentive plan to fall within
the scope of the Medicare anti-kickback provision, the hospital's intent be-
hind providing benefits to the physician must be to induce the referral of
patients to that hospital.6' It may be established that if the incentive plan is
aimed at cost efficiency and the use of the hospital's ancillary services, such
as nursing homes, and not tied directly to patient referrals, then arguably the
plan falls outside the scope of the anti-kickback provision. The broad lan-
guage of Greber does not apply to the specific physician incentive plan fact
pattern, and "[should] not be blindly applied to incentive plans.",62 If there
is no harm to the Medicare program and cost efficiency is achieved through
these incentive plans, then the health care community is benefited.
56. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
711.
57. Physician incentive plans may also take the form of group purchasing agreements for
medical office supplies, computer list networks, loan programs, IPA programs, group market-
ing and promotional campaigns, physician referral services, medical liability and malpractice
insurance, medical office evaluation, continuing education subsidies, medical office training
sessions, offices of physician relations program, as well as other individualized, innovative
plans. Bulger, Physician Incentive Programs Strengthens Bonds, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 68
(July, 1988). See also Fraiche, Definition of Issues, in PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT, RETENTION
& INCENTIVES 6 (1988).
58. Saphier, Cost Effectiveness Requires Cooperation, in MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE:
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW 124 (1986). Under PPS, physicians are still paid on a fee for
service basis, while hospitals are paid a fixed sum. In order to survive, hospitals must instill
cost-concious behavior in physicians. See Hyman and Williamson, supra note 1, at 1146.
59. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
732.
60. Richman, Physician Incentive Plan Study May Give Guidance, 15 MOD. HEALTH
CARE 48, (July 19, 1985).
61. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
733.
62. Id. at 735.
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It has been suggested that particular incentive plans may encourage physi-
cians to admit the "easy" cases, e.g. those cases which most likely produce a
profit, to hospitals which have an incentive program, while sending the
"complicated" cases to hospitals where no incentive plan exists. Theoreti-
cally, this argument makes sense, but in reality physicians generally do not
work this way, thereby negating the commonness of this practice.63 If the
hospital plan is aimed at the actual practice patterns of physicians in the
hospital, and not at the actual referral patterns of the physician, then there
seems to be no apparent conflict with the Medicare anti-kickback
provision.' 4
An example of a particular physician incentive plan which was under in-
vestigation by the HHS in 1985 was DRG incentives offered by Paracelsus
Health Care Corporation in fourteen California hospitals.65 The plan stated
that "[i]f Medicare payments for a physician's patients are above a set per-
centage (70-75%), the physician is paid a percentage of the difference; pay-
ments are figured on a monthly basis."66 It was determined by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) that "the incentives [were] too strong for physi-
cians to underprovide services or admit patients to the hospitals who might
63. Saphier, supra note 58, at 126-127. The American Medical Association's House of
Delegates adopted guidelines relating to physician ownership interest in commercial venture.
"When a physician's commercial interest conflicts so greatly with the patient's interest so as to
be incompatible, the physician should make alternative arrangements for the care of the pa-
tient." Fraiche, Anthony, Devlin and Kahn, Overview: Industry Panel, in PHYSICIAN RE-
CRUITMENT, RETENTION & INCENTIVES 3 (1988). See generally Oath of Hippocrates quoted
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1731 (1978), where it is stated that physicians convenant to
uphold above anything else the medicinal value of the medical profession. For a thought-
provoking analysis of self-interest and virtue in the medical profession see Pellegrino, Charac-
ter, Virtue, and Self-Interest in the Ethics of the Professions, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L &
POL'Y 53 (1989). But see Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments,
supra note 1, where it is argued that although it may be impractical on the part of the physi-
cian to split his admissions between hospitals based on economic reasons, it is not impractical
for a physician to opt to admit his patients to a hospital which has an existing incentive plan as
opposed to a hospital that does not, provided both hospitals are equal as to the quality of care
administered. Id. at 735.
64. See Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1,
at 735. An ethical conflict would exist, however, if the quality of patient care was sacrificed for
the economic interest of the hospital or the physician. To avoid this conflict each physician
incentive plan must be implemented with adequate safeguards protecting the quality of care
offered. Cost efficiency is not per se unethical. In fact cost efficiency within the hospital in-
creases the hospital's revenue base and allows a hospital to continue to provide competent
medical services to the community. A physician incentive plan implemented with proper ethi-
cal and legal safequards will benefit the health care community.
65. Cleveland, Prospective Payment Issues, in FRAUD AND ABUSE: UNDERSTANDING
THE LAW 9 (1987).
66. Id. at 9-10.
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not need hospitalization. ' '67 Specific objections to the plan were that the
time period for determining the payment to physicians was too short; a
strong incentive existed for a physician to admit only the less costly patients
to one hospital while admitting the more costly patients to hospitals without
an incentive plan; and no counter mechanism was employed to retain the
high quality of care within the hospital. 68 However, these findings suggest
that the implementation of a physician incentive plan with a longer, fixed
payment schedule and a mechanism to maintain the high quality of care
would be acceptable to HHS under the anti-kickback provision.
The American Medical Association (AMA) agreed with the GAO finding
and further adhered to the position that a hospital with an incentive plan
earns profits at the expense of the hospitals in the same area that do not have
incentive plans. 69 Although this position is aimed at promoting fairness
within the health care industry, this fact alone should not have any effect on
the "propriety of the arrangement."70 Theoretically, the problem could be
easily remedied because adversely affected hospitals could respond to their
competition by implementing an incentive plan of their own; 71 but because
no guidelines existed, such an adoption was inherently risky. Hospitals,
caught in a competitive vortex, would find themselves weighing the illegality
of proposed conduct against the probability of prosecution, and implement-
ing technically illegal physician incentive plans72 merely to remain competi-
tive within their health care marketplace. The reality appears to be that if a
hospital does not engage in some type of incentive plan, it is operating at a
competitive disadvantage and runs the risk of being put out of business by
competing area hospitals that provide an incentive plan for their physicians.
While the 1987 Act provides some guidance to hospitals, the need for addi-
tional, workable guidelines in this area is evident.
In structure or implementation, some physician incentive plans may run
counter to medical ethics standards. The Institute of Medicine expressed its
disapproval of DRG incentive payments by stating that "such incentive
plans place the physician in an unnecessary and unacceptable conflict of in-
terest."'73 This conflict of interest arises when the pressure from hospital
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id.
69. Richman, supra note 60, at 48; see also Hyman and Williamson, supra note 1, at 1149
n.90.
70. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
735.
71. Id.
72. See Kusserow, supra note 12, at 46.
73. Institute of Medicine, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE, (Gray ed. 1986)
quoted in Cleveland, supra note 65, at 12.
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management to increase efficiency "may compromise the physician's pri-
mary role as an independent patient advocate and detrimentally affect the
quality of patient care."74 Such a compromise in quality of care raises seri-
ous doubts as to the sanctity of the patient-physician relationship.75 But if
there was no compromise in patient care, an ethical dilemma would not ex-
ist, and the particular incentive plan could be beneficial to the health care
industry.
Prior to 1987, no guidelines existed with regard to physician incentive
plans. Even the findings of the GAO in the Paracelsus example were merely
suggestions, not criminal findings. DOJ had not enforced the illegal remu-
neration statute since Greber,76 and it was the only body from which guide-
lines for the anti-kickback provision could have come. The anti-kickback
provision of the Medicare fraud and abuse laws was developed in response to
the abuses within the Medicare system under direct cost reimbursement, not
under the PPS. "Thus, the law generally has been applied only against fairly
blatant kickback or referral fee mechanisms.", 77 Differing points of view ex-
ist on the implementation of incentive plans,78 but until guidelines are finally
issued, hospitals and physicians must be careful in formation of their plans
because, as witnessed in the Paracelsus example, the plan may still be con-
fronted with skepticism. HHS' issuance of final regulations in response to
these issues will begin to provide the needed guidance under which hospitals,
physicians, and health lawyers can operate.
B. Joint Ventures
Hospital-physician joint ventures and hospital acquisition of physician
74. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
712. See CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, § 4.05
(1986) quoted in Fraiche, Anthony, Devlin and Kahn, supra note 63, at 4:
Under no circumstance may the physician place his own financial interest above the
welfare of his patients. The prime objective of the medical profession is to render
service to humanity; reward or financial gain is a sub-ordinate consideration. For a
physician to unnecessarily hospitalize a patient or prolong a patient's stay in the
health facility for the physician's financial gain would be unethical. If a conflict de-
velops between the physician's financial interest and the physician's responsibilities to
the patient, the conflict must be resolved to the patient's benefit.
75. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
712.
76. But see Lipkis, 770 F.2d at 1448-49, where the court found that the defendant had
received anit-kickback payments, however the illegal remunerations provision (42 U.S.C.
§ 1395nn(b)) of the Medicare fraud and abuse laws was not enforced, rather the court focused
on the making of false statements provision (42 U.S.C. 1395nn(a)) of these laws.
77. Dechene, Physician Incentive Programs: Are They Legafl 4 HEALTH SPAN 3, 4 (Jan.
1987).
78. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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practices establish a form of vertical integration and an alternative source of
revenue for hospitals. The ensuing relationship between the hospital and
physician is modified just as it was under physician incentive plans; however,
these joint venture arrangements pose clearer potentially technical violations
than do the physician incentive plans. Conceivably, joint ventures "develop
multiple sources for inpatient referrals."79 The intent of the hospitals partic-
ipating in a joint venture is to preserve their existing patient base, to obtain a
referral stream, and to increase their "ability to compete with alternative
health care delivery systems."'80 "Hospitals are trying to expand the services
that they furnish to the community, to vertically integrate, and to ensure
proper access and quality care to the people in their community, but they are
not going to do it at a [financial] loss."8 1 Furthermore, a joint venture con-
tractually links the hospital and the physician. The hospital-physician rela-
tionship is solidified through this arrangement, from which future patient
referrals are more likely to result.82
The intent to increase the hospital's patient referral stream technically vio-
lates the broad prohibition of the Medicare anti-kickback provision.83 "Re-
ferral levels or revenue generated from the referrals cannot be a requirement
for the joint venture arrangement. Nor can the venture distribute funds
based upon the number of referrals or calculated as a percentage of revenue
generated from referrals."84 Under this interpretation, the survival of joint
venture arrangements is tenuous. Prior to any HHS regulation, the structur-
ing of a joint venture could only focus on the minimization of investigation
or liability of the participating hospital and physician. The joint venture
contract could not expressly mention the referral requirement. Although
the intent to provide referrals was present, it was left unwritten and only
anticipated, thereby making it difficult for the government to prove a hospi-
79. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
709.
80. Jacobs and Rubin, Institutional Purchases of Professional Practices, in PHYSICIAN RE-
CRUITMENT, RETENTION & INCENTIVE 1 (1988). Physicians also have their own incentives to
enter into joint ventures such as a favorable selling price, avoidance of medical insurance costs,
and avoidance of business and administrative risks. Id. Each incentive varies as to the actual
needs of the physicians. For an in depth analysis of the advantages of forming joint ventures,
see Barkley, Hospital-Physicians Joint Ventures.- An Expanding Field, CAL. Bus. L. PRAC. 113
(Spring 1987). For further guidance in forming joint ventures and purchasing physician prac-
tices see Sollins, Purchasing Physician Practices.- Legal and Regulatory Concerns, HEALTH-
CARE FIN. MGMT. 56 (Jan. 1988).
81. Teplitzky and Yampolsky, Historical Perspective on Joint Ventures, in MEDICARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE: UNDERSTANDING THE LAW 102 (1986).
82. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
711.
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. 1988).
84. Teplitzky and Yampolsky, supra note 81, at 111.
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tal's or physician's violation of the anti-kickback statute.8 5
To avoid a statutory violation, the anticipated patient referral stream gen-
erated by the joint venture must be coupled with legitimate medical reasons
for the referral, as well as no overutilization of Medicare funds. As evi-
denced in Greber, the courts and HHS are likely to characterize an unrea-
sonably high rate of return on a physician's investment as resulting from
overutilization, and hold the joint venture as violative of the anti-kickback
provisions of the Medicare fraud and abuse laws. 6 Also, in order to avoid a
technical violation, the parties to the joint venture must share the financial
and business risks.87 Although a lawyer, in structuring a joint venture, can
minimize the inherent legal and financial risks of joint ventures, as shown by
Greber, "no venture is completely risk free."88 It is unethical for a lawyer to
advise a client to proceed with a joint venture which is technically illegal and
where the client runs the risk of being criminally prosecuted for his
activity."
An appropriately structured joint venture potentially "promotes new
forms of health care delivery in an efficient manner." 90 An immediate bene-
fit of such a joint venture is that participating hospitals can alleviate the
financial burden of physicians in purchasing expensive medical equipment
on credit which becomes obsolete before the physician has even made full
payment. 91 Another benefit of the joint venture is that a hospital may pro-
vide the physician with access to a competent staff which in turn, allows the
physician to be more competitive within his health care market. 92 From this
perspective, the Medicare fraud and abuse laws have thwarted this type of
legitimate business arrangement which aids the health care community. But
again, the same medical, legal, and ethical issues develop with joint ventures
as were discussed with physician incentive plans. 93 These issues could be
85. See id. at 105.
86. Gaynor and Decator, supra note 13, at 27.
87. See Barkley, supra note 80, at 115.
88. Teplitzky and Yampolsky, supra note 81, at 105.
89. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1981), where "[a] law-
yer should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on
how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor." (Footnote omitted). See also id. DR 7-
102(A)(7) (1981), where in the representation of his client, a lawyer shall not "[c]ounsel or
assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."
90. Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at
744.
91. See Barkley, supra note 80, at 115.
92. See Teplitzky, Hospital/Physician Joint Ventures, in PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT, RE-
TENTION AND INCENTIVES 3 (1988).
93. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
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solved partially if the government provided workable guidelines which out-
lined legitimate arrangements as exempt from enforcement proceedings.
Prior to the 1987 Act the major problem was that no single voice of the
government could speak with authority or what might happen in any given
case. 94 "A criminal law is supposed to be absolutely clear-which is why
the agency ha[d] no authority to issue regulations on it. Many arrange-
ments, however, involve a circumstance that might be technically illegal, but
which most people presume [was] not going to be prosecuted."95 Problems
arose similar to physician incentive plans in the design of joint venture ar-
rangements. Innovation was stymied because hospitals and physicians were
weighing the illegality of their venture against the probability of prosecution
and entering into technically illegal ventures.
96
Prior to the 1987 Act and the increased advisory role of HHS, the forma-
tion of joint ventures had to reflect a valid business purpose resulting in no
over-compensation to either party, equal risk sharing, disclosure of all own-
ership interests, and the offer or receit of benefits was not connected with the
number of patient referrals. As evidenced in the discussion of physician in-
centive plans, workable guidelines had to be provided to the health care in-
dustry so as to promote clarity and a sense of certainty within this area of
the health law field.
C. Physician Recruitment Programs
Physician recruitment programs derive from the same premise as physi-
cian incentive plans and joint ventures. If any form of remuneration is given
to the recruited physician as an inducement to make Medicare referrals to
the hospital, then technically the recruitment program has violated the
94. Teplitzky and Yampolsky, supra note 81, at 105-06.
95. Id. at 106.
96. Id. at 107. Joint ventures are complex business arrangements between hospitals, phy-
sicians, laboratories and other individuals within the health care community. Each arrange-
ment must consider the legality of each of the facets presented. Many additional issues
surrounding the formation of a joint venture are not addressed in this Comment but must be
considered when implementing a joint venture. These include tax, antitrust, the corporate
practice of medicine and whether a general or limited partnership should be formed. See gen-
erally Sollins, supra note 80; Barkley, supra note 80; Teplitzky, supra note 92, Jacobs and
Rubin, supra note 80. See also Roble, Corporate Law Issues, in PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT,
RETENTION & INCENTIVES (1988); Bromberg and Hogues, Physician Investment Opportuni-
ties, in PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT, RETENTION & INCENTIVES (1988); Stewart, Physician Re-
cruitment and Contracting Strategies: Playing the Jeopardy Game, in PHYSICIAN
RECRUITMENT, RETENTION & INCENTIVES (1988); Cassidy and Wynstra, Recruitment Strat-
egies, in PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT, RETENTION & INCENTIVES (1988); Cowan, Medical Staff
Issues, in PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT, RETENTION & INCENTIVES (1988).
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Medicare anti-kickback provision.97 Physician recruitment programs vary.
Some examples of hospital offerings to physicians are as follows: "guaran-
teed minimum salaries; free or rent reduced office space; opportunities to
become limited partners in a venture such as a medical office building; equity
interest in the hospital; housing; cars; or financial resources for the physician
to develop satellite clinics."9' Again, in these instances, the recruitment pro-
gram must be carefully scrutinized prior to implementatiuon so as to avoid
the program falling under the broad interpretation of Greber.
The variety of physician recruitment programs, however, differ from the
specific factual situation in Greber. The benefits of such programs should
not be overlooked or minimized. These programs not.only can recruit good
physicians to rural communities where the physician would not otherwise
practice, but they also can attract outstanding physicians to the hospital's in
house medical staff and thereby increase the quality of care offered by the
hospitals to their communities. But, because of the potential technical ille-
galities, the Medicare fraud and abuse laws again thwarted such legitimate
and aiding medical arrangements. As of 1986 no guidelines were forthcom-
ing from DOJ.9 9 This frustration certainly was not within the congressional
purpose of the Medicare program. A clarification of the congressional intent
was needed.
IV. POTENTIAL SAFE HARBORS
Through the enactment of the 1987 Act, Congress mandated that HHS
issue guidelines, in the form of regulations, by August, 1989. Proposed regu-
lations, or safe harbors, were issued on January 23, 19891° with a comment
period ending on March 24, 1989. HHS has proposed certain areas that, if
finalized, would be deemed exempt from criminal prosecution and adminis-
trative exclusion from the Medicare program. These exemptions exhibit an
initial governmental response to the uncertainty under the Medicare fraud
and abuse laws.
97. See Comment, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note
1, at 730.
98. Id. at 727-28. Similar to joint ventures and physicial incentive plans, each type of
recruitment program depends upon'the individual needs of the participants. For differing
strategies see generally Fraiche, supra note 57, 3-4; see also Stewart, Physician Recruitment and
Contracting Strategies: Playing the Jeopardy Game, in PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT, RETEN-
TION & INCENTIVES (1988); Cassidy and Wynstra, Recruitment Strategies, in PHYSICIAN RE-
CRUITMENT, RETENTION & INCENTIVES (1988); Cowan, Medical Staff Issues, in PHYSICIAN
RECRUITMENT, RETENTION & INCENTIVES (1988).
99. Cohen, Bed Reservation Agreements, in MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: UNDER-
STANDING THE LAW 195 (1986).
100. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3088 (1989) (to be codified 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
1989]
194 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 5:175
A. Investment Interests
Under this proposed safe harbor, HHS has determined that certain invest-
ment interests, such as interest in publically owned hospitals, clinical labora-
tories, and other health care services to which patients may be referred, are
exempt from criminal prosecution and exclusion from the Medicare pro-
gram, if the interested parties meet certain conditions.1"1 The investment
interest must be in a large public corporation "so that the return on invest-
ment is, at most, tangentially related to any referrals of items or services
made by a shareholder. ,,.o2 Under this proposed safe harbor, only large
public corporations are exempt from enforcement proceedings. Other
smaller, legitimate arrangements, although technically violating the anti-
kickback provision, are still subject to the broad enforcement language of the
Medicare fraud and abuse laws. The only distinctive differences between the
two investment interests is the size of the corporation and the increased po-
tential for reflected referral payments. Both type of arrangements may pro-
vide the same amount of benefit to the community. Smaller, legitimate,
privately owned health care entities would not be exempt from prosecution
or exclusion from Medicare, thereby precluding the development of innova-
tive arrangements. Therefore this limited "safe harbor" alone does not not
provide any substantial form of guidance for health lawyers, hospitals, and
physicians because many arrangements still remain subject to enforcement
proceedings even though they are legitimate and beneficial.
HHS is considering crafting additional investment interest "safe harbors"
for certain limited partnerships and managing partnerships. If the invest-
ment interest is in a limited partnership where "a bona fide opportunity to
invest is made on an equal basis to people in a position to make referrals as
well as others, where there has been disclosure to a referred patient, and
where payments are not related to referrals . . ."" then a possible safe har-
bor may exist. If the investment interest is in managing partnerships, the
payments must not reflect referrals, and disclosure of the interest to the re-
ferred patient must exist. "
Although broadly worded, the existence of this safe harbor, including ex-
empt limited and managing partnerships, would enable health lawyers to
advise hospitals and physicians about proposed revenue enhancing plans
with more certainty and less ambiguity. Each of the required standards
101. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3090; Anti-kickback Safe Harbors: Small, 17 HEALTH POL. WEEK 1-
2 (Aug. 1, 1988).
102. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3090.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also Anti-kickback Safe Harbors: Small, supra note 101, at 2.
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must be met for a venture to be exempt from prosecution and exclusion from
Medicare. 105 If any incremental step in the formation of an investment in-
terest type arrangement is not fulfilled, the exemption will not be granted."°
To avoid an inadvertant technical illegality requires having knowledge of the
specific criteria required for the exemption. Once this knowledge is ob-
tained, health lawyers may structure and implement revenue enhancing ven-
tures with more certainty. Development within the health care community,
however, will only result if HHS constantly updates and substantiates this
safe harbor.
Physician incentive plans, hospital-physician joint ventures, and physician
recruitment programs may offer the physician a type of investment interest
that would aid the health care industry by effectively and efficiently increas-
ing the quality of care. In lieu of bonuses or benefits, hospitals may offer
physicians participating in incentive plans and recruitment programs, or
forming joint ventures, the opportunity to invest in ownership of the hospi-
tal.1o7 Under this investment interest safe harbor, if shares in the hospital,
which is a large public corporation, are not offered to the general public, or
fail to meet the minimum standards applied by HHS, then that particular
venture will not be exempt from prosecution or exclusion.'08 However, a
non-exempt venture, which does not abuse the Medicare system, increases
efficiency, and improves the quality of care offered, should not be per se
illegal.
The standards requiring that investments be offered in large public corpo-
rations and that full disclosure be made to the patient of any economic inter-
est preserve the general intent of the law, which is to prohibit illegitimate
payments based upon patient referrals and to eliminate decreasing quality of
medical care.' 09 Structured and implemented ventures that do not meet
these standards should only be presumed to be illegal. This presumption of
illegality is in accord with the congressional intent of the 1987 Act, which
requires special due process proceedings for any exclusion relating to kick-
baeks."o This proceeding allows an attorney to rebut the presumption of
illegality while informing and educating HHS of legitimate, innovative ven-
tures previously not considered when HHS was developing the safe harbors.
As a result, HHS will remain in touch with the developing health care com-
105. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3089.
106. Id.
107. See generally Koska, Physicians Now Looking to Purchase Hospitals, 62 HOSPITALS 81
(Aug. 20, 1988); Teplitzky, supra note 92 at 16.
108. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3094
109. See 1987 Act, S. Rep. No. 100-109, supra note 28, at 1, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 682.
110. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
1989]
196 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 5:175
munity. Therefore, further guidance is accomplished with increased cer-
tainty and continuity throughout this area of health care.
B. Space and Equipment Rental
Space rental agreements are usually between laboratories or other diag-
nostic services and physicians. The labs provide the physician with rental
payments for the use of the physician's office, from which patients may be
referred to the lab.' An exemption exists in such an arrangement if the
rental agreement is periodic, in writing, and periodic intervals are "set in
advance in the lease rather than allowed to vary .. on the basis of the
number of referred patients to be served at the premises."1 " 2 Secondly, the
lease must be for "at least one year so it cannot be readjusted every month
based on the number of referrals.. . 3 Third, any charge must reflect the
fair market value of the service.' 14
Similarly, the rental of office equipment to a physician is provided as a
another possible safe harbor. The same conditions apply to equipment
rental as apply to space rental." 5 As previously mentioned, hospitals can
alleviate some of the inherent financial risk for the physician who purchases
or rents highly priced and technical equipment." 6 Normally, individual
physicians, or small practices do not have the time or the capital to establish
a diagnostic laboratory which could provide analyses of patient data similar
to the type a hospital or lab might have. In the health care industry, diag-
nostic and laboratory equipment also becomes obsolete so quickly that sole
ownership of equipment by individual physicians or small practices is ineffi-
cient and not financially viable." 7 By allowing certain non-abusive hospital-
physician arrangements to be implemented, HHS has begun to foster the
growth of an efficient and an improved quality health care delivery system.
Again, if any one of the conditions for the space rental and equipment rental
safe harbors are not strictly adhered to by participants, HHS will not exempt
the arrangement. But, continued growth and a better allocation of medical
resources would be guaranteed only if HHS constantly updates these safe
harbors to include future, innovative, rental arrangements that produce effi-
cient use of health care resources.
111. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3090; Anti-kickback Safe Harbors: Small, supra note 101, at 2.
112. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3091.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also Anti-kickback Safe Harbors: Small, supra note 101, at 2.
116. See Barkley, supra note 80, at 115.
117. See id.
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C. Personal Services/Management Contracts
In personal service contracts and management contracts, an arrangement
exists under which mutually beneficial services are performed by both the
participating hospital and physician."' HHS has attempted to extend a safe
harbor to these arrangements but only if safeguards and conditions exist to
ensure that within these contractual arrangements, the opportunity to pro-
vide financial incentives to the physician, for the purpose of inducing patient
referrals to the hospital, is limited. 9
Usually, the personal services and management contracts function
through the implementation of a vehicle such as a physician recruitment
program or a hospital-physician joint venture. The intent of such an ar-
rangement is to solicit physicians who are specialists and who can perform
their expertise either within the hospital, as a head of a specialized depart-
ment, or within the extended rural communties served by the hospital. The
quality of a hospital's medical staff is directly related to the quality of care
and services that are provided by that hospital. Any program which success-
fully recruits specialists as well as quality general physicians to practice in
rural communities extends a higher quality of care and services to areas
which otherwise could not enjoy such care and services. Additionally, these
solicitations increase the revenue base of the hospital by increasing patient
referrals; however, these referrals are brought about primarily by an in-
creased quality of care and services emanating from the hospital, not from
improper financially induced patient referrals. As long as the financial in-
ducements are not centered upon the acquisition of the physician's patient
referrals, but rather centered on an increased and extended quality of medi-
cal care and services the intention of the Medicare program is met.
The business aspect of these arrangements is to make money. If these
ventures do not enhance a hospital's profitability through the increased qual-
ity of medical care and services offered to the community, the hospital will
not enter into the venture.1 20 A reasonable rate of return for the hospital's
participation in the venture is necessary for the hospital to remain financially
viable. The competitive health care market will not allow a hospital to per-
form such services uncompensated. The same unwritten intimations of pro-
ducing referrals for money will be present in the implemation of these
contracts; however, HHS should issue substantial recommendations that will
provide further guidance as to what type of personal services or management
contracts will be exempt from prosecution and exclusion from Medicare.
118. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3091.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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HHS now has the authority to issue standards that will continue to provide
certainty as to how to set up legitimate personal service and management
contracts. The implementation of this safe harbor and the expanded author-
ity of HHS begins to cure the uncertainty that has plagued innovation in the
health care industry.
D. Sales of Practice
As previously discussed, in order for hospitals to increase their revenue
base, the purchase of physician practices has become a lucrative business
venture. 2 ' HHS has attempted only to extend a safe harbor to these
purchases where the selling physician is retiring or not continuing to prac-
tice medicine on that hospital's staff, or "some other event that removes the
physician from the practice of medicine or from the service area in which he
)$122or she was practicing ....
The rational behind this proposed safe harbor is that a retiring or exiting
physician will not be in the position to make ongoing referrals.123 He is no
longer practicing medicine, and no drain on the Medicare system would ex-
ist. In a purchase where the practicing physician remains in contact with the
purchasing hospital, the potential for kickbacks exists. 124 This type of ar-
rangement conflicts with the anti-kickback provisions of section 1128 of the
Social Security Act, and is intended to be prohibited.
125
If this proposed safe harbor becomes a final regulation, HHS will have
narrowed the broad enforcement power of the anti-kickback provisions.
HHS has established an area where the legitimate hospital purchase of a
retiring or relocating physician's practice is an efficient recycling of medical
resources. 1
26
121. See Wolfe, Patients for Sale, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 1987, at C5, col. 3.




126. Id. Other possible safe harbors exist for the practice of referral services. The profes-
sional not-for-profit societies that provide a patient referral to hospital in return for a service
fee to cover costs would specifically be exempted, provided abuse does not result, such as an
overly high participation fee. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3091. In the case of profit making referral serv-
ices, the service fee should reflect a fair market value and not be tied to referrals to minimize
any risk of nonexemption from prosecution and exclusion. Companies which offer warranties
to induce the use and purchase of their equipment do not pose a service abuse problem and
therefore quite possibly may be specifically included as a safe harbor. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3092.
Provided, that the warranty is issued at the time of sale, and is solely "related to workmanship
and performance [of the product] for a specified period of time." Anti-kickback Safe Harbors:
Small, supra note 101, at 3. Furthermore, the warranty only offers recovery from reasonable
economic loss, such as the purchase price. See id.
Discounts on medical goods and services, statutorily mandated, may also be considered safe
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V. CONCLUSION
Congress has recognized the thwarting of complex, legitimate business
ventures within the health care industry due to the uncertainty that existed
under the Medicare fraud and abuse laws. The 1987 Act's expansion of dis-
ciplinary authority to HHS and mandate of promulgating final regulations
by August, 1989 provide the impetus for growth in the health care industry.
For the 1987 Act to be most effective, HHS must continue to receive input
and update the issued safe harbors. The issuance of safe harbors provides
some semblance of guidance and certainty. Subsequent updating will pro-
vide the continuous development of an efficient and improved health care
delivery system. The 1987 Act and subsequent regulation by HHS demon-
strate the increased governmental commitment to responding and curing the
health care industry under the Medicare fraud and abuse laws.
Although Congress and the HHS have responded and begun to clarify the
uncertainity that existed within the health care industry prior to the 1987
Act, many ambiguous areas involving physician incentive plans, joint ven-
tures, and physician recruitment programs still exist. HHS should provide
more substantial advice to the affected participants in these health care ar-
rangements. This advice can come from constant updating of the safe
harbors, or from possible advisory letters similar to those in the IRS and
SEC. 12 7 Health lawyers consulting hospitals and physicians must carefully
implement revenue enhancing programs that do not rely on the inducement
of patient referrals. The curative effect of the 1987 Act will not be immedi-
ately evident. For that reason, the thwarting, broad enforcement power of
harbors. 54 Fed. Reg. at 3092. Furthermore hospital's practice of waiving the collection Part
A co-insurance payments and deductibles may possibly form another safe harbor. Id.; Holt-
haus, HHS Outlines "Safe Harbor" Business Practices, 62 HOSPITALS 53 (October 5, 1988.)
This HHS opinion was a reversal from earlier drafts issued in summer of 1988. Richard Kus-
serow stated that this specific hospital practice, used to attract Medicare patients, "while tech-
nical violations of the kickback provision doles] not warrant prosecution." Holthaus, HHS
Outlines "Safe Harbor" Business Practices, at 53. Although this is not included as a proposed
safe harbor, comments were solicited, and this type of hospital practice may become a final
regulation. For a discussion outlining the structure of the Medicare program, see Comment,
Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, supra note 1, at 696-699. For an in
depth analysis of the waiving of co-insurance payments by hospitals, see Hyman and William-
son, supra note 1, notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
In an earlier HHS draft of proposed safe harbors, "physician recruitment programs" were
included as a potential safe harbor. In the subsequent promulgation of proposed safe harbors,
this type of hospital arrangement was deleted. As presented throughout this paper, properly
structured physician recruitment programs serve a viable and beneficial purpose in fostering
better health care. This type of hospital-physician relationship should be reconsidered and
implemented as a safe harbor in the final promulgation of exemptions.
127. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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the anti-kickback provisions of the Social Security Act is the law.'2 If law-
yer's implement ventures following the proposed regulations, the likelihood
of prosecution or exclusion will be minimized.
Francis J. Hearn, Jr.
128. The practicing health lawyer should also remain aware of other forms of legislation
that will affect this sensitive area within the health care industry. Congressman Stark intro-
duced the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989 (Stark Bill) on February 9, 1989. This intro-
duction illustrates that Congress is not finished curing the health care community. For this
reason, health lawyers must not only be aware of HHS developments, but also congressional
and DOJ action as well.
The following material is available through the National Health Lawyers Association in
Washington, D.C.: MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: UNDERSTANDING THE LAW (1986);
FRAUD AND ABUSE: UNDERSTANDING THE LAW (1987); and PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT,
RETENTION & INCENTIVES (1988).
